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Note
Caught Between Scalia and the Deep Blue Lake:
The Takings Clause and Transferable Development
Rights Programs
PaulMerwin*
Land use takings law has largely become an exercise in
line-drawing. Although the Supreme Court has attempted
numerous times to delineate the lawful scope of government
regulation under the Takings Clause,1 its attempts have generally produced constitutionally ambiguous lines. Despite its
many failures to clarify takings jurisprudence, the Court actually established an analytically firm line in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, creating the "categorical takings" or
"takings per se" rule.2 The categorical takings rule states that
the government must compensate landowners if regulations
completely deprive landowners of the value of their land.3
While simple enough on its face, the categorical takings
rule does not always prove easy to apply. In particular, innovative new land use tools have not lent themselves well to current takings analyses. Because of their reliance on free-market
concepts, transferable development rights (TDR) programs, an
innovative land use regulation device, complicate the analysis
of whether a taking has occurred. As will be discussed at
length in this Note, 4 TDR programs blur the bright line drawn
* J.D. 1998, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)
(establishing that a regulation that "goes too far" may violate the Takings
Clause).
2. 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
3. See id.
4. The term "transferable development rights," sometimes used interchangeably with "transferable development credits," refers generally to regulatory programs that involve the trading of property rights in a free market.
The actual implementation of programs may vary widely. See infra notes 12837 and accompanying text (discussing various purposes of and approaches to

TDRs).
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in Lucas by confusing the issue of exactly what it is that the
line is supposed to divide.
The Supreme Court recently touched on a takings challenge to a TDR program in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency. 5 Although the Suitum decision concerned only a jurisdictional ripeness issue,6 the division of the Coirt's opinion
raised questions about how a TDR scheme would fare under a
substantive takings analysis. Three Justices, in a concurring
opinion written by Justice Scalia, dissented to the portion of
the majority opinion that considered whether the plaintiff
should have to sell her development rights in order to ripen her
takings claim.7 Justice Scalia objected to this analysis because
it necessarily assumed that TDR programs could prevent a
taking,8 arguing instead that TDRs' single role lies in determining whether the property owner has received "just
compensation" after a taking has occurred, not whether the taking has
occurred in the first place. 9 In other words, for Justice Scalia
and the concurring Justices, no imaginable TDR program could
constitutionally deflect a takings claim.
Evaluating takings claims against TDR programs depends
in part on how one characterizes TDRs. Proponents claim that
TDRs represent real property rights, and therefore constitute a
use of real property.10 TDR opponents, on the other hand, argue that development rights are not property rights at all, but
instead only represent arbitrary administrative variances from
land use restrictions." This confusion has left some govern-

5. 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997). The Court overruled a Ninth Circuit opinion
which held that Suitum's claim was unripe because she had not exhausted her
administrative remedies by attempting to sell her development rights. See
Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359, 362-63 (9th Cir. 1996),
vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997). The Supreme Court held that a market-based
determination of the availability and adequacy of development rights provided
a "final decision" upon which the Court could adjudicate. See Suitum, 117 S.
Ct. at 1662.
6. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662.
7. See id. at 1670 (Scalia, J., concurring).
& See id.
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., Steven R. Levine, Comment, EnvironmentalInterest Groups
and Land Regulation: Avoiding the Clutches of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1179, 1210 (1994) (hypothesizing that
TDRs leave landowners an economically viable use of their land, thereby
avoiding a categorical takings claim under Lucas).
11. See, e.g., Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1670-71 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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ments that use TDR programs uncertain as to the constitu12
tional character of their regulatory activities.
This Note considers whether TDR programs could constitutionally deflect a takings claim that would otherwise succeed
under Lucas. It assumes, for analytical purposes, a land use
regulation that would constitute a taking under Lucas but for
the existence of TDRs.13 Part I explores takings law with respect to land use. Part I outlines the theory and application of
TDR programs. Part HI sketches the scarce treatment that the
Court has given TDR programs in takings contexts. Part IV
analyzes the effect of a TDR program on regulations that would
otherwise result in a taking. This Note concludes that TDR
programs may in fact prevent takings under a Lucas analysis.
I. REGULATORY TAKINGS
A. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
forbids the taking of private property "for public use, without
just compensation." 14 In its original conception, this clause required compensation only when the government used its eminent domain power to physically seize private lands for public

12. See, e.g., James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency- Its Impact on the FinalDecision Requirement and Its
PotentialImplicationsfor Lucas' Per Se Rule and the Role of TDRs in Takings
Analysis, 20 ZONING AND PLAN. L. REP. 65, 70 (1997) ("For municipalities and
state agencies that have used (and are still using) TDRs, the unsettled status
of TDRs in taking analysis leaves much uncertainty regarding the constitutional validity of land use and other regulatory schemes."). Doubts have
manifested themselves in planning meetings and conferences in communities
that are considering new TDR programs. Interview with Jean Coleman,
Planner for Biko Associates, St. Paul, Minn. (Nov. 10, 1997).
Of course, the benefits of TDR programs extend beyond the deflection of
takings claims. TDR programs also achieve a number of other land use goals.
See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
13. TDR programs come in a wide variety of forms, while takings law depends heavily on specific facts.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This clause is commonly known as the
"Takings Clause," the "Just Compensation Clause," or the "Eminent Domain
Clause." See Jennifer L. Bradshaw, Note, The Slippery Slope of Modern Takings Jurisprudence in New Jersey, 7 SETON HALL CoNsT. L.J. 433, 434 n.5
(1997).
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purposes. 15 Properly exercised government powers that did not
physically seize private property did not result in prohibited
takings. 16
The scope of the Clause was eventually expanded to include regulations that resulted in a physical invasion of prop7
erty, even where the government did not actually seize title.
The Court did not require compensation, however, when governments restricted property rights in order to prevent a noxious use, nuisance, or harm to the community, 18 because the
right to own property did not include the right to use it in a
way that harmed others. 19 Governments also had the power to

15. See Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 94-95 (1997) ("Early interpretations of the Takings Clause limited its application to actual government
seizures of private property.").
A primary motivation for the Just Compensation Clause grew out of the
English concern, dating back to the Magna Carta, with the Crown's practice of
claiming possession of lands without compensating the original owner. Landowners had no absolute rights to use the land as they wished. Feudal notions
of the ownership of property held that the land was owned by the Crown, and
private individuals used the land only at the pleasure of the Crown. See William Michael Treanor, Note, The Originsand OriginalSignificanceof the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 697 (1985).
Therefore, the state had the sovereign power to abrogate those property
rights.
The feudal notions of property law remained a part of early American
law. See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081-82 (1993). Property owners acknowledged that by submitting to government intrusion, they
were in fact contributing to the common good, including their own. See id
Benjamin Franklin stated that "Private Property... is a Creature of Society,
and is subject to the Calls of that Society, whenever its Necessities shall require it... its contributions therefore to the public Exigencies are.., to be
considered... the Return of an obligation previously received, or the Payment
of a Just Debt." Treanor, supra,at 700.
16. See Northern Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878).
17. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166, 180-81 (1871) (requiring compensation for flooding of private property caused by dam). There is no de minimis or public need exception for
physical takings. Even the smallest physical intrusion for the greatest public
purpose requires compensation. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); see also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,
265 (1946) (holding that a physical invasion of airspace constituted a compensable taking).
18. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1928) (upholding
law requiring destruction of infected red cedar trees that threatened nearby
apple orchards); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 412-14 (1915)
(upholding law prohibiting brickyard in residential area); see also Bradshaw,
supra note 14, at 441 (noting the Supreme Court's reasoning that an owner's
use of land may not injure the community).
19. See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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regulate land use as a means of preventing generalized harm
to the community, even if the regulation affected private property rights that did not of themselves constitute harmful or
noxious uses. 20 In other words, although a property owner suffered economic loss caused by government regulatory activities,
regulations not requiring government to physically invade a
landowner's property historically were not deemed to consti21
tute takings.
In 1922, the Court first recognized a "regulatory taking" in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.22 In Mahon, the Court noted
that a regulation that too greatly restricted the right to use
land resulted in a taking, even though no physical invasion
had taken place. 23 Although maintaining that the government
could validly reduce the value of private property through
regulation, 24 the Court held that a regulation that diminished
the value of property could simply "go[ I too far,"2 5 thus requiring the government to compensate the injured landowner
for the property value diminution caused by its regulatory activities. 26 The Court has not offered a clear test for determining when a regulation goes "too far," preferring instead to
tackle takings issues largely on a case-by-case basis.27
B. RATIONALES BEHIND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The Court may have difficulty articulating a clear regulatory takings formula because of the variety of rationales it has

20. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392 (1926)
("The harmless may sometimes be brought within the regulation or prohibition in order to abate or destroy the harmful.") (quoting City of Aurora v.
Burns, 149 N.E. 784 (111. 1925)).
21. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (citing Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 457 (1871)); see also Treanor, supra note 15, at 694 (discussing past
conceptions of the Just Compensation Clause).
22. 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922).
23. See id. at 414-16.
24. See id. at 413.
25. See id. at 415.
26. See id. at 413 (stating that if the diminution in property value
reached a "certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act").
27. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978) (explaining that, in the past, the Court generally eschewed any "set
formula" for determining how far is too far, preferring to "engag[e] in... essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries").
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advanced for the Takings Clause.28 The first rationale, presented in Mahon, reasoned that eliminating the valuable use of
property may have the same effect as a physical appropriation. 29 In Mahon, Justice Holmes applied a balancing test that
measured the social utility of the valuable use of a property
and compared it to the social utility of regulating the use of
such property. 30 Holmes noted with approval the "average
reciprocity of advantage" test, asserting that landowners do not
have a takings claim if they enjoy benefits from the regulation
that offset the burdens they must bear. 31 The average reciprocity of advantage principle still maintains its validity as a
rationale for zoning programs. 32
The harm-benefit rule, 33 another early rationale offered for
the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence, has not maintained such validity. The harm-benefit rule upheld regulations
that prevented a harm to the public, and invalidated regulations designed to confer a public benefit.34 This rule attempted
to distinguish between the valid government purpose of preventing noxious uses, and the invalid purpose of forcing one
landowner to bear the cost of a common benefit. Lucas did
away with the harm-benefit rule, characterizing the distinction
between preventing harm and promoting benefit as illusory, a

28. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE LAW:
LIMITATIONS, PROCEDURES, REMEDIES § 2A.03 (1998).

29. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414-15.
30. See id. at 414; MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 28, § 2A.04 (citing D.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.06 (3d ed. 1993)).
31. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
32. Zoning provides the most common example of a regulation that secures an overall advantage for the community that benefits landowners, despite the restrictions on the use of individual parcels. See MANDELKER ET AL.,
supra note 28, § 2A.03 ("While zoning at times reduces individual property
values, the burden is shared evenly, and it is reasonable to conclude that on
the whole the individual who is harmed by one aspect of the zoning will be
benefited by another.") (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
33. Also known as the "noxious use" rule.
34. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 638 F. Supp. 126, 136 (D. Nev. 1986), vacated, 911 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.
1990) (quoting E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 511, at 546-47 (1904)):
It may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain because it is useful to the public, and under the police power because it
is harmful.... From this results the difference between the power of
eminent domain and the police power, that the former recognizes a
right to compensation, while the latter on principle does not.
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distinction "often in the eye of the beholder. 35 The Court recognized that, as a practical matter, it could not objectively tell
the difference between a regulation that prevented a harm and
36
one that conferred a benefit.
Although the practical applications of the harm-benefit
rule have been abandoned, the reasons underlying its component parts still shape takings jurisprudence. 37 The harmbenefit rule involved two fundamental beliefs: (1) that a landowner could not lawfully use his property in a way that
harmed others; and (2) that the government should pay for
benefits that the entire community enjoys, rather than forcing
individual landowners to bear the entire cost. This rule comports with the philosophy that the Takings Clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole." 38 Although this philosophy
is clear enough in theory, the Court has not developed a set
formula for determining when the economic costs of the public
good must be borne by the government, rather than borne disproportionately by individuals. 39

35. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992).
For example, one person may see an open space preservation rule as a prevention of the harm arising from urban sprawl, while another may see it as
conferring the benefit of scenic views upon the community. Cf. id. at 1024-25.
Justice Scalia reconciled the Court's earlier use of the harm-benefit rule with
its demise in Lucas by explainingWhen it is understood that "prevention of harmful use" was
merely our early formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution in
value; and that the distinction between regulation that "prevents
harmful use" and that which "confers benefits" is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis; it becomes selfevident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory "tadngs'--which require compensation-from
regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation.
Id. at 1026; see also MANDELKER ET AL., supranote 28, § 2A.03.
36. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
37. See MANDELKERETAL., supra note 28, § 2A.03.
38. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). The Court stated
a similar philosophy in Lucas, expressing a concern that private land should
not be pressed into public service. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
39. The Court admits that it "quite simply, has been unable to develop
any 'set formula' for determining when justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government,
rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 103, 124 (1978) (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
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C. REGULATORY TAKi[NGS TESTS
1. Balancing Tests
Although many factors may affect a takings analysis, two
factors hold "particular significance": 40 "the character of the
governmental action,"4 1 and the "economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations." 42 At its most basic level, the Takings Clause
prohibits regulations that either "do[ ] not substantially advance legitimate state interests . .. or den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land."43 While many forms of regulation lead to some diminishment in property values," not all
such regulation will result in a taking, because landowners do
not have a right to the "highest and best use" of their property. 45 Instead, the Court employs a balancing test between
the landowner's interest and the benefits produced by the
46
regulation.
Evaluating the purported benefits of regulation requires
an examination of the purposes behind the regulation and the
means chosen to effectuate that purpose. A regulation advances legitimate state interests if a "sufficient nexus" exists
between a valid governmental purpose and the means of regulation applied to advance that purpose.47 A nexus exists if the
conditions imposed bear a "rough proportionality" to the pur40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), cited in Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1016.
44. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25 (providing examples of government actions that may diminish economic value, such as taxation and other
forms of regulation).
45. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
46. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)
("Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law.").
47. See Nollan v. California Coastal Conm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
The "nexus" ensures that the regulation is constitutionally proper. Because
no property owner may use her land in a way that harms her neighbors, see
supra note 19 and accompanying text, it follows that the government may impose restrictions to prevent property uses that harm the community. However, if the measures applied by the government do not further the claimed
state interest, this justification disappears. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
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poses of the regulation. 48 Courts have generally allowed governments a good deal of leeway in defining when a regulation
advances the public interest.4 9 The Court gives wide deference
to those regulations that promote "the health, safety, morals,
or general welfare,"50 and has upheld land use regulations even
if they "destroyed or adversely affected real property interests."51
The other prong of the balancing test, the property owner's
interest, is analyzed in terms of the economic impact of the
regulation. 2 Under Penn Central, the question turns mostly
on whether the owner may realize a reasonable use of or return
on the property, 53 based on whether the owner is allowed a rea54
sonable return on distinct, investment-backed expectations.
The value that the owner retains, rather than the value that
determines whether the owner receives a
the owner has lost,
55
return.
reasonable
Courts consider the entire regulatory climate in determining
whether a landowner was justified in her expectation to
56
use the property in a certain way. The rationale for this rule,
in part, is that "one who invests in property with the knowl57
edge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic loss." Even a

48. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) ("We think a
term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.").
49. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388-90.
50. See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 125.
5L Id.; see also Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (upholding
a land use regulation that substantially eliminated the economic value of
land). As the Court in Penn Central notes, zoning is the "classic example" of
regulation that can greatly diminish economic value but that generally does
not require compensation. See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 125.
52. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225, 260 (1980); Penn Central,
438 U.S. at 124.
53. See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124-25.
54. See id. The expectations must be distinct and articulable, rather than
merely hypothetical or possible. The property owner is not entitled to compensation for all possible uses of the property, but only those that he or she
might reasonably have expected to realize. See id.
55. See id. at 136.
56. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013 (1984). The
Court in Monsanto declined to limit its inquiry into the regulatory climate to a
consideration of the law in effect at the time of purchase, holding that landowners speculating for profit bore the inherent risk of a change in regulatory
climate. See id.; see also Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 109 (1997).
57. Good, 39 Fed. Cl. at 109 (citing Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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clearly reasonable expectation of use does not mean a plaintiff
will prevail.5 8 Takings challenges have failed even where the
challenged regulation prohibited a previously allowed beneficial use, even if there was substantial economic harm. 9 According to the Supreme Court, the state may make "a choice
between the preservation of one class of property and that of
[another] .60
2. Lucas Per Se Takings
Since the time of Penn Central and Agins, the Supreme
Court has expressly identified two circumstances in which a
single factor alone might determine the outcome of a takings
case: 61 (1) denial of all economically viable use; 62 and (2) physical invasions.63 Of these, the categorical takings rule has
played a significant role in TDR takings cases. Under Lucas,
regulations that effectively "den[y] all economically beneficial
or productive use of land" constitute per se takings.6 4 In Lucas,
the Supreme Court ruled that regardless of any legitimate governmental interest, a regulation that removes all economically
viable use constitutes a taking.65 Once a categorical taking has
occurred, the government must compensate the landowner for
the full value of the property lost.66
The rationale behind the Lucas rule is relatively straightforward: as Justice Scalia put it in the majority opinion, a complete denial of productive use amounts to the equivalent of a
physical taking, at least from the landowner's point of view. 67
When the government denies all use without compensating the
58. See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 124-25.
59. See id.
60. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928). The Court also held that
"the State [did] not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property [without compensation] in order to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public." Id.
61. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015
(1992).
62. See id.
63. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
441 (1982) (holding that a government regulation that authorizes a permanent
physical occupation of property so resembles the exercise of eminent domain
power that it alone constitutes a taking).
64 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
65. See id. at 1026-27.
66. See id. at 1019 n.8.
67. See id. at 1017.
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landowner, it is "less realistic to indulge [the Court's] usual assumption that the legislature is simply 'adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life, " 6S and more likely that "private
69
property is being pressed into some form of public service."
Scalia's rationale eliminates the character of the government action as a factor.70 In other words, no exercise of the police power is so compelling as to allow the complete deprivation
of property values without compensation. 71 The Lucas per se
rule does not extend, however, to regulations that merely make
explicit a common law nuisance restriction.7 2 The Court differentiated these regulations by arguing that they only prohibit
73
uses that the property owner never had in the first place.
3. Unanswered Questions
Lucas necessarily requires a determination of the extent of
a regulation's economic impact upon a landowner. 74 In determining economic impact, the Court has used a fractional comparison of the diminution resulting from the regulation over

68. Id. (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). Other commentators
have explained this phenomenon in terms that fit well with the "reciprocity of
advantage" theory. See Joseph W. Trefzger, Efficient Compensationfor Regulatory Takings: Some Thoughts Following the Lucas Ruling, 23 REAL EST. L.J.
191, 203-04 (1994). Landowners who are denied all use of their land receive
no reciprocal advantages from the regulation because they do not get to share
in the benefits of the regulation. See id. at 204.
69. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
70. See Marilyn Phelan, The Current Status of Historical Preservation
Law in Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence:Has the Lucas "Missile"Dismantled PreservationPrograms?,6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 785, 813-14 (1995).
71. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. Justice Scalia acknowledged that this
rule would in some cases create inequity between property owners who received full compensation, and those who suffered a significant (but not total)
deprivation and received nothing. See id. at 1019 n.8.
72. See id. at 1029-30. Not all complete denials of specific uses result in a
taking. The state may prohibit uses that would not be permitted under
"background principles of nuisance and property law." For example, property
owners could never use their land in a way that resulted in a nuisance, so a
regulation forbidding nuisances cannot constitute a taking. Rather, such a
regulation merely makes explicit what was previously implicit in the law, by
expressly prohibiting a use that the property owner never had in the first
place. See id. Determining when a use is prohibited at common law requires
an examination of the underlying property law of the state in question. See
id.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1016 n.7.
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the full unregulated value of the parcel.7 5 A simpler way to express this calculation is simply to subtract the value of the
property rights that the regulation removes from the total
value of the land. If the result is zero, a categorical taking has
resulted.7 6 Suppose that in Lucas, for example, the land in
question had a value of one million dollars if developed, and
zero value if left undeveloped.7 7 The regulation removed the
right to develop the property, and thus also removed the entire
million dollars' worth of value. If, on the other hand, the land
had possessed scenic value of $500,000 (even if undeveloped),
then prohibiting the development would not result in a total
diminution, because the owner still would have $500,000 worth
of use remaining in the property.
Unfortunately, the Court has not articulated a clear means
of calculating the full unregulated value of property.78 The
Court in Lucas expressly declined to define what property interest constitutes the denominator of the takings equation. 79
The property interests may arguably be divided in a number of
ways,8 0 including horizontally,8 ' vertically, 2 temporally,8 3 and

75. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
497 (1987) ("[Olur test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value
that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the
property.. .

.");

see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.

76. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 ("[We have found categorical treatment
appropriate... where regulation denies all ... productive use of the land.").
The use of a fractional analysis would result in a ratio or percentage of value
by which the regulation diminishes the value of the land. This suggests that
there is some percentage other than 100% that would be of significance. Since
Lucas only ruled on complete diminutions, this suggestion is incorrect.
77. Mr. Lucas actually paid $975,000 for the lots in question. See id. at
1006. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that Mr. Lucas had been deprived of $1,232,387.50. See id. at 1009.
78. See id. at 1016 n.7 ("Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our
'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule does not make clear the
'property interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured."); see also
John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthingthe Denominator in Regulatory Takings
Claims, 61 U. CH. L. REV. 1535, 1535-37 (1994).
79. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
80. See Fee, supra note 78, at 1537.
81. See id. at 1537 n.7 (describing horizontal interests as the most common way of dividing property rights, "meant to include any division into parcels, lots, or the like, as may be shown on a map").
82. See id. at 1537 n.8 (offering examples of vertical divisions of a parcel,
including air rights, surface rights, or subsurface rights).
83. See id. at 1537 n.9 (defining temporal divisions as "the division of
property interests into present and future estates").
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As a general rule, takings cases have not emfunctionally.
braced these distinctions; parcels of property are generally defined in terms of a cohesive whole, both in terms of physical
exists when
space and as a bundle of rights. 85 Some flexibility
7
86
temporally.
and
horizontally
interests
property
defining
The Court has found less flexibility in other contexts, ruling
that a property owner may not divide land into separate verti89
cal 88 or functional interests in order to claim a taking. Even if
a regulation completely extinguishes an aspect of property
ownership, the test remains whether the regulation goes too
far with respect to the entire bundle. 90 Thus, a regulation that
completely destroys the use of ten percent of the property is a
ten percent diminution of the whole, not a full taking of the ten
percent.

84. See id. at 1537 n.10 (describing fimctional divisions of property as including easements, rights of way, and servitudes).
85. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
497 (1987). The court noted:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses
rather both on the character of the action and on the nature of the interference with rights in the parcelas a whole....
Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978)). This generalization applies only to regulatory takings. A physical
appropriation of even a small portion of property results in a taking. See
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
86. Depending on the factual situation, the parcel may be divided into
separate physical sections. Some factors that may affect this decision include
the degree of continuity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the parcel has been treated as a single unit, and the extent to which a portion of the
property may enhance the value of other lands. See Fee, supra note 78, at
1547.
87. The Court has held that even a temporary taking is a compensable
taking. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 317-20 (1987).
88. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 500 (refusing to recognize a taking of subsurface mining rights for specific pillars of coal separately from the land as a
whole); Penn Central,438 U.S. at 130-31 (refusing to recognize a taking of the
air rights over a building without regard to the building below).
89. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (refusing to recognize
a taking when a regulation prohibited sale of eagle feathers, because other
uses of the property remained).
90. See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66 ("[Tlhe denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the
bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.").
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II. TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
TDR programs provide a regulatory mechanism for steering development away from sites that are not environmentally
well-suited for development to other, more appropriate sites.91
Professor John Costonis, in the seminal article on the modem
use of TDRs, described them as a means to protect a "low density resource" from "high density use."92 TDR programs do not
introduce radical new concepts into land use regulation. They
build on and use a number of previously existing land use
93
regulations.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAND USE REGULATIONS

The right to use property does not generally include the
right to use it to the detriment of other property owners. 94 Ancient common law, for example, first recognized the nuisance
doctrine, prohibiting noxious or disturbing uses that diminished the value of other lands.95 Although nuisance doctrine
adequately met community needs for centuries, the growth of
cities and suburbs brought conflicting uses into close proximity
and required greater land use controls. 96 As a result of the increased conflict, the prevention of nuisances grew beyond a
private right of action into a legitimate exercise of the governmental police power. 97 Demands that governments act proac-

91. See LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY & REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS FOR BALANCED DEVELOPMENT
CONFERENCE REPORT 111 (1998).

92. John Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay,
83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973). Other reasons to transfer development include a desire to protect a valuable historic or scenic area in an essentially unchanged
form. See, e.g., Penn Central,438 U.S. at 107.
93. See infra Part H.B.
94. See DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE (2d
ed. 1994).
95. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 98 (4th ed. 1997).
96. See 1 ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.03, at 7-8 (Kenneth
H. Young ed., 4th ed. 1996). Burgeoning urban areas provided an especially
sharp lesson in uncontrolled growth, as landowners competed to erect skyscrapers sooner than and larger than their neighbors in order to win the fight
for light and air. See EDWARD M. BASSETT, ZONING 315 (1922).
97. See BASSETT, supra note 96, at 319-20 (describing the growing acceptance of the use of the police power in land use regulation). The right of governments to prevent nuisances extended even to the restriction of activities
that existed before communities "came to the nuisance." See, e.g., Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding regulation that prohibited brickmaking factories, as noxious uses, in residential areas).
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tively to control and channel the new urban growth led to the
98
development of modern land use regulation based on zoning.
Zoning provisions may designate the lawful use of property
in a particular area, imposing restrictions such as lot size,
square footage limitations, height restrictions, and setback distances from roads.99 Early zoning ordinances envisioned a
standard growth model, a grid of proportionate square lots.100
This scheme worked well in dense urban areas, but lacked the
flexibility to control sprawling growth in suburban and rural
landscapes. 0 1 The "first wave" of land use revisions impacted
not only the types of uses allowed, but also the manner in
which those developments occurred. 10 2 Some of these revisions,
0 4 cluster
such as comprehensive planning, 10 3 floating zones,

98. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1922). The
ordinance at issue in Euclid focused on the protection of single-family residences from other encroaching uses such as industrial, commercial, or multidwelling units. See id. at 379-80. Euclid held that restrictions on such uses
constituted a legitimate use of state power and was not a taking. See id. at
395.
99. See, e.g., id. at 379-83 (setting forth the details of one town's zoning
ordinance).
100. See id.
101. See James Poradek, Note, Putting the Use Back in Metropolitan
Land-Use Planning:PrivateEnforcement of Urban Sprawl Control Laws, 81
MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1348-49 (1997) ("By emphasizing low-density develop-

ment and a wide separation of uses, suburban zoning rejected schemes of
compact, integrated development and encouraged sprawling development.").

102. See Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Com-

parative Discussionof Environmentaland Land Use Techniques in the United
States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 565, 568 (1992) (describing two waves of
zoning revisions).
103. See Poradek, supra note 101, at 1350-51.
104. Floating zone ordinances describe the characteristics that the zone
will have, but do not designate a location. The zone comes into being and attaches to an area when the governing board finds a situation that meets the
criteria in the ordinance. See CALLIES ET AL., supra note 94, at 69. While
there is some split, most jurisdictions allow floating zones as long as they are
not arbitrary or inconsistent with the comprehensive plan of the district. See,
e.g., Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 736 (N.Y. 1951)
(upholding a floating zone ordinance); Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 133
A.2d 83, 92 (Md. 1957) (upholding a floating zone ordinance on grounds that it
was not "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable"). But see Eves v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 164 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. 1960) (holding a floating zone ordinance
invalid because it made land use impermissibly dependent upon landowner
applications). Care must be taken to differentiate floating zones from "spot
zoning," which impermissibly amends the zoning code in a limited area. See
CALLIES ETAL., supra note 94, at 69.

830

MINNESOTA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 83:815

development,10 5 or planned unit developments,10 6 attempt to
overcome the rigidity of "Euclidean zoning" in favor of flexible
standards.10 7
B. TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS
The "second wave" of land use revisions i08 introduced market based regulatory methods into traditional command and
control schemes. 09 Market based regulation attempts to create
financial incentives for desirable behavior, rather than simply
outlawing undesirable behavior." 0 TDR programs replace or
supplement command and control zoning with a tradable
rights program that attempts to shift development into desired
patterns.'

105. Cluster developments attempt to cluster development closer together
than is usually permitted, allowing the consolidation of open space for other
purposes, such as parks or agriculture. See JOHN S. WILSON ET AL.,
COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A MANUAL FOR
PLANNERS 173-74 (1979).
106. Planned unit developments are areas in which certain planning goals
are established but the exact implementation is flexible. The community may
set certain goals through the planning process and designate goals for growth.
For example, the community may designate that a certain percentage of
growth be dedicated to residential, commercial, or other uses. See CALLIES ET
AL., supranote 94, at 138.
107. See id.
108. See Kayden, supra note 102, at 568 (describing two waves of zoning
revisions).
109. See id. at 568-79 (describing several regulatory programs using market approaches to achieve regulatory goals). Economic incentives have been
used to address a wide range of environmental and resource protection goals
within a regulatory scheme. See JOHN H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND
PRICES (1968); Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits
of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (1985); Law and Economics Symposium: New Directions in EnvironmentalPolicy, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153
(1988). A common example of market based regulation is in the area of air
pollution. The federal Clean Air Act sets a ceiling on pollution by selling a
number of "pollution credits." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1994). Industries
may buy credits at auction or may trade with other industries. See id. In this
way, the amount of pollution remains constant, but is distributed to the most
economically viable use. See Adam J. Rosenberg, Emissions Credit Futures
Contracts on the Chicago Board of Trade: Regional and Rational Challenges
to the Right to Pollute, 13 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 501, 503-10 (1994) (describing pollution trading plan).
110. See Kayden, supra note 102, at 566 (discussing movement from command and control model to market based model of environmental regulation).
111. See id.
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TDR programs are based on the theory that some rights of
property ownership may be separated from others.11 2 Property
ownership is treated like a "bundle of sticks."" 3 Property owners have a set of rights that come with the ownership of land,
each of which can be separated from the other.1 4 Leasing is a
simple example of a property owner dividing his "sticks," in
which the owner retains the title of the land, but gives someone
else the right to possess and use the land.115 Another familiar
example is separating the ownership and use of the surface
land from the mining rights to minerals found below." 6 In
much the same way, the right to develop property in a certain
way may be separated from the right to possess the land.
The common law of property recognized this through
easements, which gave one person a non-possessory interest in
someone else's property." 7 In other words, the easement
holder had the right to use the property or restrict the use of it
even though he did not own the land itself."8 A modem, specialized form of easement called a conservation easement deals
particularly with restrictions on development for conservation
purposes." 9 Conservation easement holders purchase the right
to develop property in certain ways and remove that right from
0
the property. 2
112. See John J. Delaney et al., TDR Redux A Second Generationof Practical Legal Concerns, 15 URBAN LAW. 594, 596 (1983).
113. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
435 (1982).
114. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425 (noting that the rights to "possess, use
and dispose of' property are separate strands in the bundle).
115. See CALLIES ETAL., supra note 94, at 242.
116. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)
(dealing with situation in which mining companies owned mineral rights to
underground coal separate from the property rights of the surface owners).
117. See CALLIES ET AL., supranote 94, at 244.
118. See id.
119. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 84C.01 (1996). The statute defines a conservation easement as:
a non-possessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real
property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreation,
or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.
120. This concept has been used by governments and conservation groups
in purchase of development rights (PDR) programs, a precursor to TDRs. See
TOM DANIELS & DEBORAH BOWERs, HOLDING OUR GROUND: PROTECTING
AMERICA'S FARMS AND FARMLAND 145 (1997). PDR operates just as the name
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TDR programs carry the concept one step further. Because development rights may be removed from a property, it
seems logical that they may be added to a property. Rather
than simply buying the development rights from property owners, governments establish a market through which property
owners may trade development rights amongst themselves.1 21
While the details of TDR programs vary, most have four basic
components. 122 First, they designate a preservation area, usually called the sending area, from which development is discouraged or transferred. 23 Second, they establish a designated
growth area, known as the receiving area, to which development rights are transferred. 124 Receiving areas are those in
which further development does not present a threat, and usually have already been developed to some degree. 125 Landowners in receiving areas may purchase development rights in order to develop their property to a greater extent than would
normally be allowed under local land use regulations. 26 Third,
TDR programs have a pool of development rights that are legally separated from the land in the sending area. 27 Finally,
TDR programs establish a procedure by which development
rights may be transferred from one location to another.
TDR programs vary in their specifics. Governments may
either create a voluntary incentive program 128 or a mandatory
suggests. The development rights of a piece of property, in the form of an
easement, are purchased and held separately from the ownership of the land
itself. See id. Subsequently, the landowner may not develop the land in a
way covered by the easement, because he literally has sold off the right to do
so. See id.
121. See Costonis, supra note 92, at 85-86 (describing the transfer of development rights as "break[ing] the linkage between particular land and its development potential by permitting the transfer of that potential").
122. See DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 120, at 174.
123. See id; see also AMANDA JONES GOETTSEGEN, PLANNING FOR
TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK FOR NEW JERSEY MuNICIPALITIES 29-30 (1992) (identifying criteria to consider when designating

sending areas). Some of the uses of TDR programs have included preservation of historic buildings, farmland, open space, or coastlines.
124. See DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 120, at 174.
125. See GOETTSEGEN, supra note 123, at 9-10 (identifying criteria to consider when designating receiving areas).
126. See id. at 46. For example, if a landowner owned a lot that was zoned
for one residence, he could, by purchasing a development right, build two
residences on the lot.
127. See DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 120, at 174.
128. Voluntary programs attempt to use financial incentives to preserve
land, and do not prohibit development in sending areas. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
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program that prohibits development in sending areas. 129
Sending and receiving areas may be designated on a zoning or
a permit basis. 3 0 Zoning-based TDR programs designate broad
sending and receiving areas through the standard zoning process, 13 1 and generally attempt to protect large tracts of open
space 3 2 or agricultural land. 133 In contrast, permit-based programs do not identify broad sending areas, but identify characteristics or criteria that determine whether a particular parcel
34
may be developed.
The exact form of development rights varies with each specific TDR program. For programs designed to preserve historic
sites, the property owner might receive air rights that may be
used to add size to a different building. 35 For programs that
protect residential or agricultural open space, the TDRs might
be measured simply in terms of a number of building units per
acre.1 36 The rights transferred can also be very complicated,
ANN. § 13:18A-30 (West 1991) ("Pinelands Development Credit Bank Act").
Voluntary programs allow property owners to sell development credits in return for placing a conservation easement on their land. See GOETTSEGEN, supra note 123, at 105-07. Because voluntary programs do not prohibit development, this Note focuses on the takings implications of mandatory TDR
programs.
129. See, e.g., MONTGOMiERY COUNTY, MD., CODE §§ 59-C-1.39, C-9.6 to C9.7 (1997).
130. See Robert A. Johnston & Mary E. Madison, From Landmarks to
Landscapes: A Review of Current Practices in the Transfer of Development
Rights, 63 J. Ai. PLAN. Ass'N 365, 366-67 (1997).
131. See id.
132. See, e.g., BOULDER COUNTY, COLO., LAND USE CODE art. 6 (1996).
133. See, e.g., MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 59-A-6.1 (1997).
134. The regulation at stake in Suitum provides a good example of a permit-based TDR program. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S.
Ct. 1659, 1662-63 (1997). Calculating the amount of development allowed at a
site involves a complex process. The TRPA designates sending and receiving
areas through a complex site evaluation known as the Individual Parcel
Evaluation System (IPES) that uses scientific standards to determine the
ecological effect of development on a given parcel. See id. Sites with an IPES
score below a certain level may not be developed, but may transfer their development rights to sites with a score above a certain level. See id.
135. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
112(1978).
136. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 59-C-9.6 (1997). Montgomery County downzoned a sending area of 78,000 acres of agricultural land
from one building right per five acres to one per twenty-five acres. See
DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 120, at 175. Then the county gave each property owner in the sending area one TDR for every five acres owned. See id.
The county allowed landowners in the receiving areas to add one dwelling unit
per acre by purchasing TDRs. See id.

834

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:815

especially in programs that use complex environmental analy137
ses to determine site uses.
TDR programs offer several advantages over traditional
land use tools. TDR programs allow governments to avoid imposing harsh regulations on community members. 138 This is
because TDR programs provide a method by which communities may spread the cost of regulation to the entire community,
and particularly to those individuals that benefit. 139 In doing
so, TDR programs prevent "free riders," individuals who avoid
the costs of regulation but reap substantial benefits. 140 TDR
programs also avoid the direct outlay of public funds to acquire
easements or real estate. 141 By avoiding harsh regulation or
inequitable profit, TDR programs provide a tool for implementing regulations that a community would otherwise lack
the political will to enact.142
As land use regulations, TDR programs have been subjected to substantial judicial scrutiny. All land use programs,
TDRs included, must be enacted properly within the powers of
the government body. 43 TDR programs in particular must
create development rights with some degree of certainty, stability, and proportionality to the original property rights that
the regulations restricted.'i

C. DEFINING TDRs IN LEGAL TERMS
The precise legal nature of TDRs has been the subject of
some debate. Some courts and commentators have treated

137. The TRPA Regional Plan, for example uses a very complex site
evaluation system to assign development rights. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at
1663.
138. See GOETTSEGEN, supra note 123, at 3.
139. See id. at 7.
140. See Trefzger, supra note 68, at 197.
141. See Delaney et al., supra note 112, at 596; DANIELS & BOWERS, supra
note 120, at 171-72.
142. See GOETTSEGEN, supra note 123, at 3 (arguing that the need for
TDRs stems from a lack of the political will to use traditional land use tools to
their full potential).
143. See West Montgomery County Citizens Ass'n v. Maryland-National
Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 522 A.2d 1328, 1329 (Md. 1987) (striking
down a TDR program because it was enacted improperly through the planning
process, rather than through the properly delegated zoning process).
144. See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381
(N.Y. 1976); see also Delaney et al., supra note 112, at 594.
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TDRs as real property interests.1 45 Others, most notably Justice Scalia, hold the belief that TDRs are arbitrary regulatory
variances, albeit valuable ones.1 46 One commentator has argued that some, but not all, TDR programs transfer true real
property interests.147 In this view, only those TDR programs
that explicitly and legally define the development rights as
true property interests, and protect them accordingly, actually
transfer real property interests.1 48
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of the validity and nature of TDRs the way
that Euclid determined the validity of zoning.1 49 Many courts
have seemed to accept without question or analysis the assertion that TDRs are property interests, often citing to the
"bundle of sticks" analogy. 50 Other courts have taken the Supreme Court's dicta on TDRs in Penn Central'5' as ratification
of TDRs' status as property rights.1 52

145. See Richard J. Lazarus, LitigatingSuitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency in the United States Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179
(1997).
146. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1671-72
(Scalia, J., concurring); see also Lazarus, supra note 145, at 199-200.
147. See James M. Pedowitz, Transferable Development Rights, in AIR
RIGHTS, AIR SPACE, AND TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

33, 35-36 (PU

Real Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 269, 1985)
(arguing that most development rights programs only transfer the "residual
post-zoning development potential," rather than the true development rights
that "consist of the unrestricted right to use and develop one's property").
148. See id. at 39-42. Pedowitz offers the Suffolk County, New York Plan
as an example of a program that transfers true property rights, because it operates under a statute that recognizes the permissibility of severing true development rights, and it offers protection from loss by adverse possession or
other law that may defeat the enforcement of an interest in real property. See
i.; see also James M. Pedowitz, Air Space and Air Rights, in AiR RIGHTs, AIR
SPACE, AND TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 57, 66-68 (PU Real Estate
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 269, 1985) (citing N.Y. GEN.
MUN. LAW § 247(4)).
149. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
150. See, e.g., West Montgomery County Citizens Ass'n v. MarylandNational Capital Park & Planning Comnm'n, 522 A.2d 1328, 1330 (Md. 1987)
(summarily explaining TDR programs using the "bundle of sticks" analogy).
151. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137
(1977).
152 See, e.g., Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81, 108 (1997) (citing Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 137) (stating that TDRs represent uses of property that
should be considered when evaluating a takings claim); Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991) (upholding development restrictions against takings challenge based in part on availability of TDRs);
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Indirect evidence also exists to support the claim that development rights are property interests. Members of the real
estate community treat them like property rights. 153 Realtors
have listed and sold development rights like any other real
property. They are appraised both as a part of their underlying parcel and as individual units. The insurance industry has
also recognized TDRs as property, offering title insurance for
development rights.
I. THE SUPREME COURT ON TDRS AND TAKINGS
The Court has had little occasion to rule directly on the
validity of TDR programs as they relate to takings claims. Although the Court has dealt with TDRs in a takings context on
at least two occasions, those cases have left the exact nature of
TDRs "unsettled."154 The Supreme Court touched on TDR programs in Penn Central, noting that TDRs "undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed... and,
for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering the
impact of regulation."1 55 The word "mitigate" remains without
complete definition and does not answer the central question of
whether TDRs prevent a taking or merely compensate for one.
Penn Central does not provide a clear answer to this question; in fact, the language in the case is contradictory on the issue. 156 At one point the Court notes explicitly that if there has
been a taking, it would then consider "whether the transferable

City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332, 1338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (citing Penn Central,438 U.S. at 137).
153. See, e.g., Gordon v. Flamingo Holding Partnership, 624 So. 2d 294,
297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the removal of development rights
from a property will impair an interest in collateral); Patricia Grace Hammes,

Development Agreements: The Intersection of Real Estate Finance and Land
Use Controls, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 119, 164 (1993) (comparing TDRs to devel-

opment agreements, stating that "[a] vested right in development represents
one of the key sticks in the bundle that constitutes real property").
154. See Holloway & Guy, supra note 12, at 69.
155. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137. The Court in Penn Central,however,
declined to rule on the validity of the TDR scheme standing alone. See id. at
122.

156. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regl Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1671
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Whereas once there is a taking, the Constitution requires just (i.e. full) compensation, a regulatory taking generally does
not occur so long as the land retains substantial (albeit not its full) value.")
(citations omitted); see also Joseph D. Stinson, Transferring Development
Rights: Purpose,Problems, and Prospects in New York, 17 PACE L. REV. 319,
333 (1996).
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development rights . . .constitute 'just compensation' within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment."157 This clearly places
TDRs on the compensation side of the line. Later in the opinion, however, the court seems to confuse the issue by referring
to TDRs as compensation, but still considering them when determining the impact of the regulation.15 8 Determining the impact of the regulation, the Court notes, goes toward determining if there has been a taking in the first place.15 9 Then-Justice
Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion in Penn Central, left no
doubt that he considered TDRs relevant to compensation
only. 60 He noted that he would consider TDRs as relevant to
the inquiry only if they "constitute a 'full and perfect equiva" 161
lent for the property taken.
The most recent attempt to apply takings law to a TDR
program concerned regulations in the Lake Tahoe basin, an
area long prized for its natural beauty. 162 In recent decades,
the Tahoe area has grown greatly, and so has the strain on its
delicate ecosystem. 63 The aggregate effect of various human
activities threaten the environmental quality of the whole basin. 64 Hoping to preserve the quality of the lake, Congress directed the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA)165 to
amend its comprehensive land use plan to minimize the adverse effects of increasing population. 66 The plan focused, in
157. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 122. Since the court found that a taking
had not occurred, it did not put this part of the test into practice.
158. See id. at 137.
159. See id. at 124-25.
160. See id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 152; see also Stinson, supra note 156, at 333.
162. See Carl R. Pagter & Cameron W. Wolfe, Jr., Lake Tahoe: The Future
of a NationalAsset-Land Use, Water, and Pollution,52 CAL. L. REV. 563, 564
(1964).
163. See Respondent's Brief at 2-4, Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 117 S.Ct. 1659 (1997) (No. 96-243).
164. A combination of factors contributed to the degradation of the environmental quality of the area, including water use, disposal, and runoff. See
id.
165. See Suitum, 117 S.Ct. at 1662-63. The agency was created through
interstate compact by California and Nevada and approved by Congress in
1969. See Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969).
166. In 1980 Congress revised the compact to require the TRPA to preserve the environmental and recreational qualities of the region through the
adoption of a binding regional plan that barred any development that failed to
contribute to attaining or maintaining specific "environmental threshold carrying capacities." See Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980). The regional
plan, as later amended in 1984 and 1987, attempts to protect the delicate wa-
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part, on reducing human impacts in stream environment zones
(SEZs),167 which play an essential role in water flow and filtration, maintaining the area's delicate hydrological balance.1 68
Bernadine Suitum bought a parcel of land in the Tahoe
basin in 1972,169 but when she applied for a building permit in
1989, the TRPA determined that the lot was located entirely
within an SEZ, and forbade any "additional land coverage or
other permanent land disturbance" on the lot.170 Suitum sued,
claiming that the regulation denied her all economically feasible use of her property and resulted in a categorical taking under Lucas.171 In many ways, Suitum's claim parallels the facts
of Lucas, in that both cases involved a restriction on development in order to prevent environmental harm. 172
One major fact differentiates Suitum's claim from that in
Lucas: although prohibited from developing her property, the
TRPA's comprehensive plan allowed Suitum to sell the unused
development rights from her property.173 Suitum refused to
participate in the program, calling it a "sham" and claiming
ter quality of the lake by restricting residential, commercial, and tourist uses
in the drainage area. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662-63.
167. See Respondent's Brief at 25aa, Suitum (No 96-243).
168. The clarity of the lake is due to the very low level of sediment and nutrients in the water. This results from the relatively small land surface area
of the lake's drainage basin and the filtering effect of the SEZs. See Respondent's Brief at 2, Suitum (No. 96-243).
169. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1660.
170. The TRPA evaluates sites using an Individual Parcel Evaluation System (IPES). See id- at 1662. IPES assessments consider several factors, including relative erosion hazard, runoff potential, access, the presence of
stream environment zones, the condition of watershed, ability to revegetate,
the need for water quality improvements in the vicinity, and the distance from
Lake Tahoe. See IPES-IndividualParcelEvaluation System (visited Nov. 4,
1998) <http://www.ceres.ca.gov/trpa/ipes.html>. Suitum received the lowest
possible IPES score (zero), placing her property in the worst possible category
for development. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662-63.
171. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
172. In Lucas, the South Carolina Coastal Council, in order to prevent
coastal damage and erosion, established a baseline along the beach beyond
which construction of residences was prohibited. As a result, no other economically viable use of the property remained. See id. at 1008-09.
173. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1660. The program consisted of three marketable credits that Suitum could sell. One is a residential allocation, which
is simply a permit to construct a residence. The second is a residential development right, the right to build a residence on a parcel of land. See Respondent's Brief at 8, Suitum (No. 96-243). Suitum could also transfer her potential land coverage, the amount of impermeable surface allowed on a particular
lot. See id
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a constitutionthat the development rights did not provide her
174
taking.
a
prevent
could
ally sufficient use that
The TRPA countered by arguing that Suitum had not ripened her claim because she had not attempted to sell the development rights she was given, and could not, therefore,
maintain that they had no value. 17" As a result, the TRPA
could not reach a "final decision" as to how she could use her
property, nor could the Court know the full economic impact of
the regulation on her investment-backed expectations for her
property. 176 The Court held that sufficient methods of valuating the TDRs existed to allow a court to decide upon the legality of the regulation. 177 It thus found her claim ripe for review
and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Suitum does not provide explicit guidance as to the nature
of TDRs, but does avoid the "mitigation" contradiction found in
Penn Central.178 Although refusing to deal with the substantive issues directly, 179 the Court implicitly treated the TDRs'
valuation as relevant to the determination of whether a taking
had occurred.18 0 By even bothering to decide that Suitum's
claim was ripe because the market could determine the value
of her TDRs, the Court seemed to believe that TDRs were relevant,18 1 a point with which Justice Scalia and the concurring
Justices disagreed.
174 See Petitioner's Brief at 20-21, Suitum (No. 96-243).
175. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1664.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 1668-69. The TRPA's expert real estate appraiser submitted an affidavit stating that the land could be sold for $35,000, and that development rights at similar parcels had sold for prices ranging from $18,500 to
$32,000. See Respondent's Brief at 140-43, Suitum (No. 96-243).
178. The Court specifically avoided ruling on this issue:
While the pleadings raise issues about the significance of the TDRs
both to the claim that a taking has occurred and to the constitutional
requirement ofjust compensation, we have no occasion to decide, and
we do not decide, whether or not these TDRs may be considered in
deciding the issue of whether there has been a taking in this case, as
opposed to the issue of whether just compensation has been afforded
for such a taking.
Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1662.
179. See supra note 178.
180. See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1668-70.
181. Chief Justice Rehnquist's position is especially interesting. By not
joining in Justice Scalia's concurrence, he essentially abandoned the position
taken in his Penn Central dissent. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978); see also supra notes 160-61 and accompanying
text.
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Justice Scalia would have held Suitum's claim ripe for review without regard to the TDRs, because he did not feel that
TDRs affected the issue of whether a taking had occurred.18 2
Justice Scalia believed that the TDRs represented only a
regulatory variance, not an actual use of or interest in property.18 3 Although he agreed that the TDRs had value, he considered them monetary compensation at best, or a new right
exchanged for the taking. 8 4 He argued that because the question of whether a regulation "goes too far" 85 only refers to the
extent to which the land is restricted, not the extent to which
the landowner is compensated, TDRs do not affect the determination of whether a taking occurred. 8 6 Instead, Justice
Scalia argued, TDRs merely represent compensation for a
taking-in other words, he saw no constitutional distinction
between a property owner who receives payment from the government in an eminent domain action, and one who receives
payment through the sale of development rights the government has granted.18 7
IV. TDR PROGRAMS PASS TAKINGS TESTS

A. APPLYING CURRENT TAKINGS LAW TO TDR PROGRAMS
1. TDR Programs Sidestep the Lucas Categorical Takings
Test
The first step in analyzing a TDR program in light of a
takings claim requires determining whether the program falls
under the categorical takings rule of Lucas. The test in Lucas
boils down to the question of whether the regulation removes
one-hundred percent of the value of the property. If so, the
analysis ends, and the regulation must be invalidated. 8 8
Unfortunately, the Court's analysis in Lucas does not point
to a clear resolution of the argument, raised by Justice Scalia in

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
(1992).

See Suitum, 117 S. Ct. at 1670 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See id. at 1671.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016

19991

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

841

18 9 The
Suitum, that TDRs do not represent a use of property.
Court in Lucas declined to decide exactly which property inter90
ests constituted the relevant parcel of property.1 Because the
Court defines property interests according to their usefulness,
this question, slightly rephrased, makes up the crux of Justice
Scalia's argument in Suitum: do the development rights represent a use of the property?'91
Several mechanical arguments support the assertion that
TDRs are real property interests. The simplest of these is the
assertion that the right to develop constitutes a stick in the
bundle of property rights. 92 While the bundle analogy may illustrate that property interests are divisible, 193 it has never
fully defined exactly what rights constitute a full bundle 94 and
to what extent they may be divided. 95 However a significant
number of courts, legislators, and commentators have accepted
and applied the analogy to TDRs.' 96 The sheer ease with which
a large portion of the legal community has accepted the notion
that development rights constitute a severable stick in the
bundle supports the idea that TDRs are property rights. At
the very least, such widespread acceptance shows that such a
conclusion is neither shocking nor absurd.
Ironically, private property rights advocates themselves
have asserted that denying the right to develop constitutes the
denial of a property right, even if other uses remain in the
property. The plaintiffs in Penn Central, for example, argued
that a restriction from building a skyscraper onto Grand Central terminal denied a property right, although plaintiffs retained several profitable uses from the terminal without further improvement. 97 It would be disingenuous to argue that

189. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
19L See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
194. The Court has, however, determined that some interests do not constitute part of the bundle of property rights. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (providing examples of potential property uses that do not
rise to the level of property rights).
195. One may presume that the infinite possibilities for the development of
land do not all constitute legally cognizable interests.
196. See supra notes 145, 150-53 and accompanying text.
197. The fact that the Penn Central plaintiffs lost does not mean that they
were wrong about the right to develop constituting a property right. The
Court recognized it as a property right, but held that it was an acceptable
deprivation. The Court's balancing test weighs the governmental interest
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the right to develop constitutes a real property right if it is the
only use denied, but not when it stands alone.
Another argument is that development rights have been
treated as property interests for other purposes. For example,
the real estate and insurance industries have treated them as
property, placing liens on TDRs and also offering title insurance for them. Development rights have been taxed as property, and banks have formed security interests in them. Development rights also bear similarity toward options to buy, which
may constitute personal property interests.
The "use" that development rights provide is not diminished merely because it is an economic use rather than a
physical use. In weighing takings claims, the courts quickly
interpret "use" to mean "value."'9 8 The Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence measures the economic deprivation a property owner suffers against that owner's reasonable investmentbacked expectations. 9 9 After all, "what is the land but the
profits thereof?" 2 00 TDRs offer an economic use for property by
providing a vehicle for profit. 20 1
Justice Scalia based his decision on the belief that assigning a development right that a property owner may redeem for
cash is no different than the government offering monetary
compensation for a taking. 02 This might be the case if the government were conferring a right unrelated to the property interest and the real estate market. This is not the case, however, with TDRs, which give property owners a stake in the
free market valuation of the worth of the development transfer
out of their property.203 TDRs provide economic value by allowing the property owner to "use" the property as a means of
obtaining profit on the free market-thereby preventing a
taking from ever occurring.204

against the value the landowner retains, not the extent to which potential
value has been lost. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 55-56.
199. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
200. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017
(1992) (quoting 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am. Ed. 1812).
201. Suitum, for example, could have sold her property and development
rights for up to an estimated sum of $67,000. See supra note 177.
202. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
204. See Levine, supra note 10.

19991

TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

843

Admittedly, the profit a landowner may realize through
the sale of development rights may be considerably less than if
the landowner had been allowed to develop the land as he saw
fit.205 However, the Takings Clause does not require that the
landowner retain the "highest and best use," but only a rea6
sonable use of the property. 20 At any rate, the quantity of use
allowed does not enter into the question of whether to apply
Lucas, under its own terms. Under Lucas, it is enough to say
that the landowner is left with some viable use of the property. 207 If TDRs constitute any sort of use at all, then Lucas
does not apply.20 8
2. Penn Central
If Lucas does not apply, the Court would then perform a
Penn Central balancing test.209 Most TDR programs should
pass such a balancing test, because they advance substantial
state interests 210 while finding a211unique way to reduce the burdens on individual landowners.
Governments generally select TDR programs over other
land use regulatory devices because a special public interest
212 TDR proexists or a problem has defied other solutions.
grams across the country have achieved numerous worthy
goals, including the preservation of natural resources, agricultural land, historic buildings, or scenic areas. The justifications for TDR programs, therefore, go even beyond the mere
"general welfare" that basic land use regulation seeks to serve,
and address particularly pressing and thorny community contherefore pass a takings balanccerns. TDR programs should
213
ing test under Penn Central.

205. For example, Suitum would have to forego the indeterminate but undoubtedly substantial value of a Lake Tahoe home in exchange for an estimated maximum of $67,000 for her development rights. See supra note 177.
206. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
208. See supranotes 64-69 and accompanying text.
209. See supranote 46 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 46 and accompanying text
211. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 40-60 and accompanying text (describing the Penn
Central balancing test).
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B. AN ALTERNATIVE VIEw: NOT APPLYING CURRENT TAKINGS
LAW TO TDR PROGRAMS

The question of whether TDRs comprise a property interest and, therefore, a use under Lucas need not be the entirety
of a takings analysis. Even if viewed only as a regulatory variance, 2 14 a well-drawn TDR program may prevent a taking, even
if regulations do prohibit all development on a parcel of land.
To reach this conclusion, one must step outside of traditional
takings law and evaluate TDRs in light of the purposes of the
Takings Clause.
As an initial matter, TDR programs alleviate Justice
Scalia's fears that private land is being pressed into public
service. 215 Within the context of a systematic and comprehensive land use scheme, fears of disproportionately burdening a
private individual have less basis. 216 If this is in fact Justice
Scalia's concern, then a program that distributes the cost of
community benefits across the private sector should dispel it.
Lucas approved of regulations that merely "adjust[ ] the
burdens and benefits of everyday life," noting that the Court
usually "indulges" in the "assumption" that most regulations
do so. 217 The Court found this assumption difficult to make in
the case of a total deprivation of use.2 18 If the Court is looking
to determine whether a regulation shifts the "benefits and burdens of everyday life," it need not always depend upon a mere
assumption. TDR programs, by their nature, shift the benefits
and burdens of land use regulation. Perhaps more importantly, TDR programs shift the benefits and burdens more equitably than traditional land use regulations.219
At times, traditional land use regulations may operate like
a sort of lottery for landowners. Some may find their property
restricted by regulation that benefits the entire community,
while others profit from extensive development and enjoy the
benefits of the land use regulation. For example, if a scenic
area is regulated to keep development to a minimum, landowners in that area must forego the opportunity to develop the
land at a profit. Owners of adjoining land, however, may de214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
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velop their property at a premium because of its proximity to
the scenic area. TDR programs temper this sort of inequityin the above case, for example, a TDR program would require
landowners who wished to develop their property to purchase
22 0 This aldevelopment rights from the restricted landowners.
lows the community to regulate the development, while shiftto the benefited parties
ing some of the costs of the regulation
221
and avoiding the free-rider problem.
TDR programs fulfill the purposes of the Takings Clause
by
more thoroughly than the narrow application of Lucas2does,
2 2 Jusavoiding the all-or-nothing results that Lucas creates.
tice Scalia in Lucas admitted that the decision was unfair to
those landowners who suffered less than one-hundred percent
diminution in value.22 3 A landowner who suffers a onehundred percent loss of the use of his land receives onehundred percent compensation, while a landowner who suffers
a ninety-five percent loss receives nothing.22 4 TDR programs
provide a way to alleviate this inequity.
Professor John Costonis once described takings jurisprudence as a debate between two opposing groups: (1) the "police
power enthusiasts," who favor active government regulation
and oppose compensating regulated property owners;225 and (2)
"private marketeers," who favor a laissez-faire attitude toward
government regulation and believe that property owners who
are restricted by a regulation should be compensated.2 2 6 Professor Costonis argued that this polarity would force government action to extremes, either imposing harsh, uncompensated regulation on landowners, or paying landowners
complete compensation for regulation through the eminent
domain power. 227 Professor Costonis proved an able predictor,
and the Lucas categorical rule today imposes an even greater
extreme than he envisioned at that time. 228 As a solution to
220. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. TDRs alleviate, to some
extent, the problem of those landowners who have been regulated off of their
land.
222. See supra note 71.
223. See supra note 71.
224 See supra note 71.
225. See John Costonis, Fair Compensation and the Accommodation
Power, 75 COLUM. L REV. 1021 (1975).
226. See id. at 1024-27.
227. See id. at 1038.
228. See supra note 71.
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this dichotomy, Professor Costonis suggested an "accommodation" power, which envisioned land use regulation along a
spectrum of intensity.2 2 9
The application of an accommodation power compromises
between the opposite poles of harsh governmental regulations
that heavily burden landowners with no compensation and the
need to completely compensate landowners for valid regulation.230 TDR programs have provided a middle ground, and illustrate the viability and desirability of an accommodation
power. TDR programs provide a means to balance the costs
and benefits of regulation more equitably among all parties.
Under Lucas, landowners in a regulated area fall into
three groups. First, landowners whose right to use their property is completely restricted receive full compensation for their
land. Second, landowners who are heavily affected by a regulation, but retain some use, receive nothing. Finally, those who
own adjoining land reap the benefits of the regulation and suffer no detriment. All three groups pay for the regulation
equally, because the costs of the regulation must come from
general government revenues (taxes).
TDR programs blur the harsh distinctions found in the
above scenario. In a TDR program, both of the first two groups
would receive some compensation, in proportion to the degree
to which the regulation reduced the value of their land and
forced them to sell development rights.231 The exact amount of
compensation would depend on the market for development in
the area.232 The costs of the regulation would fall upon those
adjoining landowners who benefited from the regulation, who
would have to purchase development rights to develop their
property further.2 33
The theory of the Tahoe land use plan shows the potential
benefits offered by TDRs. Lake Tahoe was being loved to
death.234 As more people crowded in to enjoy the splendor of
the lake, the lake lost that splendor.235 While Suitum may
have wanted a home on beautiful Lake Tahoe, her home would

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234
235.

See Costonis, supra note 225, at 1049-55.
See id
See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 128-27 and accompanying text.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
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have contributed to the decline of the lake.2 36 Eventually, such
homeowners would lose the very reason they wanted to live
there in the first place.
The TRPA faced a dilemma. It became clear that certain
development in stream environment zones had to be restricted.
Yet, such restrictions would have harsh effects on landowners
like Suitum. As a result, the TRPA could be forced to buy out
landowners like Suitum, an expensive proposition in Lake Tahoe. The beneficiaries would be adjoining landowners, who
would enjoy increased property values as a result of the regulation, but would bear none of the costs.
The TDR program provides an equitable compromise, and
could distribute the burden of the regulation to other landowners. Granted, Suitum would not get to build a house on her
property. But the TRPA did not create the environmental crisis that led to the regulation.2 3 7 It did not arbitrarily single out
Suitum for harsh regulation, it merely tried to find the fairest
method to respond to the demands of the natural environment.
It may be unfortunate when nature requires human beings to
forego their desires, but at least Suitum was not forced to bear
the burden of the regulation alone.
Under Justice Scalia's formulation, the TRPA would face
two equally unpalatable options: abandon the regulation, or
buy out every landowner in an SEZ. Abandoning the regulations would doom the lake to a slow decay.238 Attempting to
buy out all SEZ properties would likely have the same effect.
Given the property values in the Tahoe area, the agency could
hardly afford the price of this option, and would have to abandon or sharply curtail the regulation. If that were to happen,
everyone would lose.
CONCLUSION
TDR programs may meet the constitutional requirements
of the Takings Clause in one of two ways. First, they pass the
takings analyses that the Court has currently put in place.
TDR programs avoid the categorical takings rule of Lucas by
providing landowners with an economic use of property. 23 9
TDR programs meet the goals of the Takings Clause, and avoid
236.
237.
238.
239.

See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

162-64 and accompanying text.
162-64 and accompanying text.
164-68.
64-66 and accompanying text.
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many of the evils that takings law seeks to prevent. 240 TDR
programs also pass a balancing test under Penn Central, providing benefits to the community that outweigh the economic
burden on regulated landowners. 241 This is especially true because the economic burden is distributed among the beneficiaries of the regulation.2 42 TDR programs may also find constitutional acceptance by forcing a reconciliation of the extremes
found in takings law today. Market-based regulations like
TDR programs avoid the twin evils of uncompensated oppressive regulation and forced public compensation in order to
achieve valid and pressing community goals.
The innovation represented by TDR regulations benefits
both regulators and landowners. Well-drafted TDR programs
deserve praise for presenting difficult compromises to thorny
land use problems. TDRs do not, however, fit neatly within the
boxes that current takings law has provided. Forcing such an
outdated and extreme analysis will only serve to stifle regulatory innovation.

240. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 211, 219 and accompanying text.

